by Patrizia Piredda
When he stopped his studies of engineering in Manchester,
Wittgenstein moved to Cambridge to study logic under the guidance of
Bertrand Russell because he believed that by comprehending the
fundamentals of language, and therefore the limits of language, he would
understand its essence, as well as that of human beings, in primis, himself.
For Wittgenstein, knowing oneself was indispensable because only the
man who knows himself can improve himself and become morally decent.
When World War I broke out, Wittgenstein volunteered in the Austrian
Army because he trusted “the fact that the experience of war would
permit him to understand, beyond any fiction and illusion, who – which
kind of man, so to say, – he really was. Thus, it was clarity and truth
about himself that Wittgenstein expected from the war” (Perissinotto
13).
Wittgenstein spoke about the experience of World War I in two
different diaries: the first one is a work-notebook in which he wrote
his thoughts, questions and the progress of his work on logic (which was
eventually published under the name of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus),
as well as his reflections on ethics, the function of philosophy, and
such concepts as the will, the good, evil and suicide. The second one is
a personal diary, composed of three notebooks which begin on 9 August
1914 and end on 19 August 1916, written in a secret code so that none of
his comrades could read it. During the war years, in contact with other
soldiers and immersed in the military life, Wittgenstein went on
working on the problems of language, but he slowly changed the focus of
his research and broadened his interest beyond logical problems: in a
letter of 22 May 1915 to Russell, Wittgenstein wrote that the problems
in which he was interested “have become more and more precisely and
general”, and that his method “has drastically changed” (Wittgenstein, Lettere 75): now, it was fundamentally oriented toward ethics.
For Wittgenstein, the encounter with the other in war was an
existential experience that allowed him to look within the depths of
himself in order to question himself and understand who he was. This in
turn would allow him to correct errors in his thought, to eliminate
prejudices, faults and erroneous judgments and, finally, to act well. To
reach this state of deep knowledge, Wittgenstein had to understand
which role the passions and reason play in making moral decisions, so as
to put the former under the control of the latter: in other words, at
this time in his life, acting as a decent and moral person meant for
Wittgenstein being able to understand and control his own passions
which, generally, lead a person to make practical decisions in order to
satisfy private and egoistic desires without considering whether the
action is good or bad. At first, Wittgenstein believed that the war
would make men better; however, early in the conflict the promiscuity
that he saw in other soldiers made him start to believe that war cannot
change the nature of human beings: if possible, it makes people’s moral
tendencies even worse. Wittgenstein changed his mind because, in his
opinion, his comrades did not attempt to understand what was happening
to them, even though they were going through a new and traumatic
experience that demanded understanding; instead, they kept on following
irrational passions and base desires. If, as Wittgenstein wrote on 12
August 1916, “a bad life is an unreasonable one”; if living in sin –
i.e. living enslaved to passions and desires – means living “in discord”
(Wittgenstein, Diario 118); and if a life without knowledge is evil, then his comrades could not logically appear to him as good persons.
From the first notes of his diary, Wittgenstein wrote that he was
horrified by his comrades’ vulgarity: he did not consider them stupid,
but he believed that they were limited by the “typical attitude of the
majority of men, according to which they mirror themselves in what they have instead than in what they are”
(Gargani, 11). Since, in his opinion, his comrades chatted only about
“nonsensical” things based on prejudices and superficialities,
Wittgenstein felt deep disquiet (Unheimlichkeit), and as a result
he depicted them as scoundrels dominated by the most selfish instincts
and lust, which led them to a loss of self-control and to immorality. On
21 August 1914 Wittgenstein wrote: “The lieutenant and I have spoken
about many different things. He is a very kind person. He can cope with
the worst scoundrels and be kind to them. If we hear a Chinese speak, we
tend to consider his speech an inarticulate gurgle. The person who
understands Chinese will recognise the language. Thus I often cannot
recognise humanity in man, etc. […] all concepts of my work have become
‘foreign’ to me. I cannot really SEE anything!!!” (Wittgenstein, Diario 54).
In contact with the other soldiers, Wittgenstein could no longer see
what might be called humanity, nor could he recognise in others his own
human essence, i.e. a rational creature who strives to know himself in
order to be morally good. Therefore, Wittgenstein was not able to
perceive others as friends, because friendship for him could only arise
between good men: he had an elitist sense of friendship, founded on
respect, dialogue, loyalty, love and a deep sense of ethics which, in
his opinion, his comrades seriously lacked. On 15 August 1914 he wrote:
“The crew is a gang of scoundrels! No enthusiasm, incredible vulgarity,
stupidity and cruelty. Therefore, it is not true that the great common
cause necessarily makes man nobler… According to all our external
conditions, our duty on the boat should provide us with a wonderful and
happy time, but alas! As a result, it will be very difficult to
communicate with the others” (Wittgenstein, Diario 52-53).
Moreover, two days before, on August 16 1914, he wrote that “the
stupidity, the insolence and the evil of these people have no limits”
(Wittgenstein, Diario 53). Beyond these severe and tranchant
judgments, Wittgenstein did not believe that he was a better man than
his comrades, but that he had a stronger will to become better. In fact,
one of the major differences that Wittgenstein perceived between
himself and the other soldiers was the awareness that he was not yet a good man. In the letter of 3 March 1914 to Russell he wrote: “we both have our weaknesses, but I do especially, and my life is FULL of the most awful and miserable thoughts and actions (and this is no exaggeration)… Until today my life has been full of filth” (Wittgenstein Lettere
67); on 7 March 1915 he moreover wrote: “I feel like a completely burnt
out stove, full of impurities and filth” (Wittgenstein, Diario 101).
Nevertheless,
during the war Wittgenstein went on trying to improve himself, to
control his body’s weaknesses and get close to the order that derives
from reason, which however belonged in its pure form only to God. At
that time young Wittgenstein believed that such an order is located in
our language: for him, there was a correspondence between good use of
language and good action, thus it followed that thinking well is
acting well. According to this correspondence, thanks to a constant
effort to free himself from linguistic errors (prejudices, common
statements, nonsense, false and erroneous reasoning) a person might
aspire to live a decent life: on 20 July 1916 Wittgenstein wrote to
himself in his diary: “continue to work and you will become a good man”
(Wittgenstein, Diario 116).
The will moves man to strive for absolute good, beyond the partiality
of a mundane ‘good’ corresponding to private desires. To reach absolute
good, one needs a full view (Überblick) of things even if this
seems to be a desperate attempt: on 12 November 1914 Wittgenstein wrote:
“I have worked quite a lot, but without seeing very clearly
(Wittgenstein, Diario 79); on 13 November 1914: “I cannot see clearly” (ibid.)
and on 16 November 1914: “no clarity yet. Although I am right in front
of the solutions to the deepest questions, so near as to almost crash
into them with my nose!!! Now my spirit is simply blind to these things!
I feel as if I am RIGHT IN FRONT OF the door to the solution, but I
cannot see clearly enough to open it” (Wittgenstein, Diario 81).
Moreover, if on 29 July 1916, in a moment of desperation after being
shot at, Wittgenstein wrote that he was afraid of dying and losing the
pleasure of life, some days before, on 8 July 1916, he had written that
such a fear was a misleading feeling because “fear of death is the best
sign of a false life, i.e. a bad life” because “he who is happy must not
fear. Not even death” (Wittgenstein, Quaderni 219). Even if it
is a desperate attempt, one always should (or better, must) try to go
beyond one’s own limits because only in this way is it possible to
fight the irrational fear in which lies the sin that leads men to
believe that a false conception is true.
Contrary to the common experience of war, wherein a soldier
considers his comrades to be his friends and the opponents, the unknown
soldiers, the enemy who must be fought, Wittgenstein considered his
comrades his principal enemy, from whom he had to defend himself.
Wittgenstein’s concept of friendship, however, was embodied in David
Pinsent with whom he was in a close contact during the war: they had
become friends when both of them were studying in Cambridge. During
the war, since Wittgenstein was fighting in the Austrian Army and
Pinsent was fighting in the English Army, they should have considered
themselves enemies. Pinsent died on 8 May 1918. Wittgenstein was
informed of his death by a letter from Ellen Fanny Pin, David’ mother,
sent dated 6 July 1918, to which he replied, writing that Pinsent had
been his first and only friend: “I have indeed known many young men of
my age and have been on good terms with some, but only in him did I find
a real friend; the hours I have spent with him have been the best in my
life, he was to me a brother and a friend. Daily I have thought of him
and have longed to see him again. God will bless him” (Monk 155).
To him Wittgenstein dedicated his Tractatus logico-philosophicus.
For further reading
Gargani, Aldo, Il coraggio di essere, in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Diari segreti, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1987, pp. 1-45
Marconi, Diego, Wittgenstein e la filosofia, in Ludwig Wittgenstein, La filosofia, Roma, Donzelli, 2006, pp. vii-xxxvii
Monk, Ray, Ludwig Wittgenstein. The Duty of Genius, New York, The Free Press, 1990
Perissinotto, Luigi, Wittgenstein. Una guida, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2010
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Diari segreti, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1987
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Lettere. 1911-1951, Milano, Adelphi, 2012
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Quaderni 1914-1916, in Tractatus logico-philosophicus – Quaderni 1914-1916, Einaudi, Torino, 2009, pp. 127-299